

PERSEREC

Technical Report 01-5
August 2001

**SSBI-PR Source Yield:
An Examination of Sources Contacted During
the SSBI-PR**

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14. ABSTRACT A six-person team of highly experienced personnel security adjudicators and investigators reviewed 4,721 case files at four agencies routinely conducting the Single-Scope Background Investigation-Periodic Reinvestigation (SSBI-PR): Department of Defense (DOD), Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). Information was obtained regarding subjects' backgrounds, the sources that were included in the PRs, whether sources provided issue and/or mitigating information, and the type and adjudicative value of the information that was provided. Information yield was shown to differ dramatically across sources, and differences in source productivity were consistent across organizations. SF-86/SPHSs, Subject Interviews and Credit Reports consistently yielded issue and mitigating information most frequently. The majority of SSBI-PRs did not contain "Issue-Relevant Information" and less than 5% of the SSBI-PRs resulted in "actionable" outcomes by the participating organizations. These and other findings provide a foundation for designing an improved SSBI-PR process. Using data from this study, a second PERSEREC report, <i>A New Approach to the SSBI-PR: Assessment of a Phased Reinvestigation</i> , demonstrates how a phased approach to the SSBI-PR adjudicative process could achieve a more effective periodic reinvestigation program on a community-wide scale.
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Preface

This report presents the findings of a study on the productivity of sources used in Single-Scope Background Investigations-Periodic Reinvestigations (SSBI-PRs). It explores the amount of issue and mitigating information that is generated by investigative sources and examines the proportion of SSBI-PRs that contain information of relevance to personnel security. This study also identifies types of sources that most frequently provide information relevant to specific adjudicative issues and establishes which sources are most likely to provide information in SSBI-PRs where no other sources do so.

The findings from this report provide the foundation for another PERSEREC publication, *A New Approach to the SSBI-PR: Assessment of a Phased Reinvestigation*, which examines the validity and usefulness of a phased SSBI-PR. Taken together, the two studies provide a basis for making significant improvements in the effectiveness and efficiency of the SSBI-PR investigative process.

This study was co-sponsored by the Personnel Security Managers' Research Program and PERSEREC. The project would not have been possible without the cooperation of the Defense Security Service, the Office of Personnel Management, the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Reconnaissance Office – organizations that provided the case files for review and other assistance. The study was truly a community-wide effort.

James Riedel
Director

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Executive Summary

Executive Order 12968 requires that investigators contact a variety of individuals and obtain a diversity of records for Single-Scope Background Investigation-Periodic Reinvestigations (SSBI-PRs). Given that the number and type of sources included in periodic reinvestigations affect their cost, timeliness, and effectiveness, the Defense Personnel Security Research Center and the Personnel Security Managers' Research Program conducted a joint study to gain an improved understanding of the relative yield of SSBI-PR sources in terms of providing information relevant to the adjudication process.

A six-person team of highly experienced personnel security adjudicators and investigators reviewed 4,721 investigative files at four agencies routinely conducting the SSBI-PR: the Department of Defense (DOD), the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). Information was obtained regarding Subjects' backgrounds, the sources included in SSBI-PRs, whether the sources provided issue information and – for sources providing issue information – details as to its type and adjudicative value. Data were also collected regarding the severity of adjudicative issues reported in case files and whether the organization itself took action on the adverse information.

Despite the wide diversity of personnel at the four organizations (which ranged from contractors at NRO to active-duty military and government civilians at DOD), the relative yield of issue and mitigating information across SSBI-PR investigative sources was similar. The types of sources yielding information most frequently were the same for the four organizations, suggesting that improvements to the SSBI-PR process that are founded upon differences in source productivity could potentially be implemented across the security community. Additional key findings of this investigation include the following:

1. The majority of SSBI-PRs do not contain information that is relevant to establishing an issue of security concern. Only 23% to 35% of SSBI-PRs (depending on the organization) contain information defined as "Issue-Relevant."
2. Approximately 1% to 5% of SSBI-PRs (depending on the organization) result in actionable or potentially actionable outcomes by the adjudicative agency (e.g., the adjudicative decision results in specific actions such as monitoring, waivers, administrative sanctions, etc.).
3. The most commonly occurring type of Issue-Relevant Information is Financial Considerations. The percentage of Potential Issue Cases with Financial Considerations issue information range from 33% to 59%.
4. Self-Report and Records Sources, together, yield 87% of all Issue-Relevant Information yet constitute 38% of the total cost of conducting PRs. In contrast, Interviews of Others

provide 14% of the total Issue-Relevant Information and yet compose 61% of the total cost.

6. The three most productive sources – the SF-86/SPHS, Subject Interview and the Credit Report – provide information in nearly all cases in which any other sources provide Issue-Relevant Information. These sources accurately identified 87% to 95% of Potential Issue Cases and 92% to 100% of cases upon which the organizations took some sort of administrative action.

Taken together, these findings provide the starting point for designing an improved SSBI-PR process. Using data from this SSBI-PR source yield study, a second PERSEREC report, *A New Approach to the SSBI-PR: Assessment of a Phased Reinvestigation*, demonstrates how a phased reinvestigation could result in a more effective and efficient periodic reinvestigation program.

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Introduction

On 27 March 1997, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs issued the investigative standards required by the August 1995 Executive Order 12968, *Access to Classified Information*. These standards were approved by the President and established guidelines for conducting background investigations for individuals requiring access to classified information. Standard C outlines the reinvestigation requirements for access to TOP SECRET, Sensitive Compartmented Information and "Q" access authorizations (see *Appendix A* for Investigative Standard C). To meet these requirements, Single-Scope Background Investigation-Periodic Reinvestigations (SSBI-PRs) are to be conducted not later than five years from the date of the previous investigation. The SSBI-PR requires that investigators contact a variety of individuals and obtain a diversity of records. At issue for the current study is the degree to which different SSBI-PR sources yield information that is relevant to personnel security.

Purpose

Because the number, type, and productivity of sources affects the timeliness, effectiveness, and cost of periodic reinvestigations, a study was conducted to gain a better understanding of the relative information yield of sources used in SSBI-PRs. This study seeks to identify (a) the proportion of SSBI-PRs that contain information relevant to personnel security, (b) the SSBI-PR sources that yield the greatest issue and mitigating information, (c) the types of sources that provide the most information about particular adjudicative issues, (d) the types of sources that are most likely to provide information in SSBI-PRs where no other sources do so, and (e) the relationship between the amount of information obtained from different sources and the cost of these sources. In answering these and other research questions, this study provides a foundation for a complementary report, *A New Approach to the SSBI-PR: Assessment of a Phased Reinvestigation*, in which the policy implications of the current investigation and additional analyses are presented in detail.

Methodology

Sample Size and Selection

The SSBI-PR case files used in this study were obtained from Department of Defense (DOD), Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). Below is a brief description of the samples and how the periodic reinvestigations came to be included in this study.

- DOD: Because it was not possible to select a random sample of cases from DSS (Defense Security Service) due to circumstances related to their computer-processing system, the 1,611 SSBI-PRs completed by DSS between February and May 2000 were selected for inclusion. They include PRs completed for military, DOD civilians and contractor personnel.
- OPM: A random sample of 1,332 SSBI-PRs completed by United States Investigations Services (USIS) for OPM between 1 April 1999 and 31 March 2000 was selected for

inclusion. This sample constitutes 9% of the 15,626 SSBI-PRs completed for OPM during this time period. All cases are government civilians and contractors. None of the PRs were conducted by OPM for DOD.

- CIA: A random sample of 855 SSBI-PRs adjudicated by CIA during the time period of 1 October 1999 to 31 September 2000 was selected for inclusion in the study.
- NRO: A random sample of 923 SSBI-PRs adjudicated by NRO from 1 October 1999 to 31 September 2000 was selected. Almost all of these PRs (95%) were for NRO contractors.

The size of the sample for each organization (except DOD, in which the entire population of cases from the specified time frame was included) was determined by statistical requirements. The sample sizes described are more than sufficient to provide 99% confidence that measures of source yield shown in this report are accurate within a range of $\pm 4\%$.

Coding Process

Procedures were developed to help ensure the accuracy and integrity of data. These included the hiring of coders with extensive adjudicative and relevant investigative expertise, the initial and ongoing training of these coders, and the use of data-collection software, hardware and procedures that were designed to minimize coding error.

Coder Selection and Training

Each member of the coding team (five to six persons depending upon coder availability) had either extensive adjudicative or investigative experience. Four of the coders had more than 50 years of combined adjudicative experience across DOD and the Department of Energy. The remaining two coders had more than 10 years of investigative experience conducting background investigations for the intelligence community, DOD, and other government agencies. Additionally, four of the six coders had a combined total of 38 years of counterintelligence experience and 29 years of criminal investigation experience.

Coders were familiar with procedures used by organizations conducting SSBI-PRs and were knowledgeable of the adjudicative guidelines used by federal agencies. Prior to on-site training, coders completed a two-day seminar conducted by USIS (formerly known as USATREX), a company that trains adjudicators for a variety of federal agencies. This seminar involved a comprehensive review of the *Investigative Standards for Background Investigations for Access to Classified Information* and the *Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information* and informed coders as to the current thinking about adjudicative issues. On-site training familiarized coders with the data-collection software programs, case files, and coding procedures as well as unique organizational requirements. Coders were provided a handbook containing an operational definition of each variable and instructions for entering data into the database.

Coding Instrument

The Microsoft Access[®] software programs that were used to code data from SSBI-PR case files were designed to minimize coder fatigue and to assure data completeness and

accuracy. Wherever possible, menu items were developed allowing coders to select from a range of response options rather than typing in data. The programs notified coders instantly if required information was missing or if data entered were inconsistent with the type or range of expected values.

Coders began coding a case file by entering information for the demographic variables in the "Subject Information Screen" (the first screen in the coding software program). After completing this form, coders proceeded to the "Source Selection Screen," where they indicated which sources were included in the PR and whether the sources provided issue information. For each of the sources that provided issue information, coders then indicated the type of issue information (i.e., Alcohol Consumption, Allegiance to the United States, Criminal Conduct, Drug Involvement, Emotional, Mental and Personality Disorders, Financial Considerations, Foreign Influence, Foreign Preference, Misuse of Information Technology Systems, Outside Activities, Personal Conduct, Security Violations, or Sexual Behavior), the importance of the information (i.e., whether it was "Issue-Relevant"), and whether mitigating information was also provided by the source. When a coder was unsure of the proper way to code a variable, it was discussed among the group in an effort to reach consensus.

While the majority of the variables for which data were collected remained consistent across the four sites, a few items were removed or added to the data-collection software programs to accommodate unique organizational requirements.

Inter-Coder Reliability

To assess coding consistency, tests of inter-coder reliability were conducted for each of the four organizations. These tests calculated the degree to which all possible pairings of coders assigned the same values to the same variables when coding the same files. Findings from the two methods employed – percent agreement and the computation of a kappa coefficient – show that coding agreement for the variables used in this study are within commonly accepted standards of consistency (Landis & Koch, 1977; Oksenberg, Cannell & Kalton, 1991; Shrout & Fleiss, 1979; Tinsley & Weiss, 1975). Detailed information on the procedures and results of inter-coder reliability measures are presented in *Appendix C*.

Variables

Demographic, source, issue and adjudicative outcome information was gathered. Because the PRs of some organizations contained unique information, some variables described below were not coded for all organizations. These variables are noted.

Demographic Information

Demographic variables are as follows:

- Age: year of birth
- Sex: male or female
- Employee Type: contractor, civilian, military enlisted or military officer
- Citizenship: born U.S. citizen, naturalized or non-U.S. citizen

- Current Marital Status: married, single, divorced, separated or widowed

Sources in the SSBI-PR

SSBI-PR sources were grouped into three general categories: Self-Report Sources, Records Sources and Interviews of Others.

Self-Report Sources include the following:

- SF-86/SPHS: the *Questionnaire for National Security Positions* (CIA uses the SPHS)
- Subject Interview: interview of Subject

Records Sources include the following:

- Credit Report: current credit bureau report
- NAC/Subject: national agency check for the Subject; includes INS Files, DCII (Defense Central Index of Investigations), SII (Security/ Suitability Investigations Index), FBI Fingerprint Check (a technical fingerprint search of fingerprint cards submitted by law enforcement agencies concerning persons arrested, charged, or convicted of criminal activity), the FBI Headquarters Check (a check of files that contain security, applicant and criminal investigations), the FBI Name Check (a name check of the Identification Division files that is conducted when the fingerprint card is not classifiable, or on Single Agency NACs, or in TOP SECRET PRs when prior investigation included an FBI/ID check), and the FBI/ID check (a search of fingerprint databases)
- NAC/Spouse-Cohabitant: national agency check for Subject's spouse or cohabitant
- LAC: check of local agency records
- Employment Records: performance evaluations, work attendance records, letters of reprimand, etc.
- Military Records: military service records
- Security Records: review of security records pertaining to Subject (includes occasional interviews with Security Managers)
- Title 31 Records: Large Currency Transaction Reports, FinCEN, etc.
- Medical Records: case files, treatment records, etc. (Medical Records checks are triggered by the discovery of issue information in a case)
- Education Records: degrees, diplomas, transcripts, etc.
- Public Records: verification of divorces, bankruptcies, other court actions, etc.

- Residence Records: lease agreements, rental agreements, etc., to confirm residence and payment history
- Miscellaneous Records: records not fitting any other category

Interviews of Others are listed below.

- Coworker Interview: interview with Subject's coworker
- Supervisor Interview: interview with Subject's supervisor
- Listed Reference: interview of references listed on Subject's SF-86/SPHS
- Developed Reference: interview of reference who is developed through any other interview source
- Residence Interview: interview of Subject's past or present neighbors
- Ex-Spouse Interview: interview of former spouse/cohabitant
- Medical Interview: interviews of therapist, social worker, psychiatrist, etc. (triggered by the discovery of relevant issue information in the case)
- Area Security Manager: interview of Subject's Security Manager
- Miscellaneous Interview: interview not fitting any other category

Source Inclusion

Important considerations in assessing source information-yields are the conditions under which sources come to be included in investigations. For example, some sources such as the Subject Interview are included in every SSBI-PR except under the rarest of circumstances (e.g., if the Subject is traveling abroad and cannot be reached). Other sources such as Ex-Spouse Interviews are conducted whenever the investigation allows for it (i.e., whenever the Subject has an ex-spouse or ex-cohabitant within the scope of the PR). Finally, a third circumstance may be distinguished: a source that only becomes relevant to an investigation *after* the discovery of issue information. Examples of this type of source are Medical Records and Medical Interviews, which are conducted only in investigations following the discovery of issue information concerning an Alcohol Consumption, Emotional, Mental and Personality Disorder, or Drug Involvement issue for which medical treatment was received. Relevant to the findings presented in this report, the conditions under which sources come to be included in an investigation affect the likelihood that they will be productive. Sources that are used specifically to gather *additional* information about an issue in an investigation have greater probability of providing information when compared with sources that are used in investigations regardless of whether any other issue information is present.

Issues Information

The *Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information (Appendix D)* outlines 13 general areas of concern regarding a Subject's background

and behavior. Coders indicated when sources provided “Issue-Relevant” information pertaining to the below-listed adjudicative areas.

- Alcohol Consumption
- Allegiance to the United States
- Criminal Conduct
- Drug Involvement
- Emotional, Mental and Personality Disorders
- Financial Considerations
- Foreign Influence
- Foreign Preference
- Misuse of Information Technology Systems
- Outside Activities
- Personal Conduct
- Security Violations
- Sexual Behavior

Source Yield

The nature and value of the information provided by sources was coded in two primary ways. Coders indicated if a source provided “Issue-Relevant Information” about any of the issue areas listed above, and whether the source provided “Mitigating Information.” These terms are defined as follows:

Issue-Relevant Information: information relevant to establishing that an issue is of potential current security concern and/or information that an adjudicator would want to review in making a clearance decision.

Mitigating Information: information that explains, refutes, moderates or lessens Issue-Relevant Information.

Examples of information that would be considered Issue-Relevant include the following:

- Information pertaining to marijuana use occurring within the current PR cycle or at any time since being granted access and which had not been previously known or adjudicated. Previously adjudicated marijuana use which had occurred in a prior investigation cycle would not be considered Issue-Relevant.
- Information pertaining to an arrest for DUI (driving under the influence) occurring within the current reinvestigation cycle would be Issue-Relevant. A previously adjudicated arrest for DUI that had occurred in a prior investigation cycle would not be Issue-Relevant. A DUI arrest prior to the current PR cycle that had not been previously disclosed might be Issue-Relevant especially if coupled with alcohol-related problems occurring within the current PR cycle.

- Information pertaining to a bankruptcy occurring within the current PR cycle would be Issue-Relevant but a previously adjudicated bankruptcy would not be Issue-Relevant Information.
- Information pertaining to a pattern of late payments occurring within the current PR cycle would be Issue-Relevant but a previously adjudicated history of late payments would not be Issue-Relevant Information.
- Information pertaining to a security violation occurring within the current PR cycle and which has already been adjudicated would not be Issue-Relevant Information. However, if the security violation had not been adjudicated, the issue would be considered Issue-Relevant.

Mitigating Information is information that explains, refutes, moderates or lessens Issue-Relevant Information.

Case Severity

Cases containing one or more items of Issue-Relevant Information (for any adjudicative area) were defined as "Potential Issue Cases."

Actionable Cases

Cases in which one or more items of Issue-Related Information led to some form of adjudicative action are called "Actionable Cases." Adjudicative actions include but are not limited to revocations or suspensions of access, warnings, reprimands, assignments to monitoring programs, risk management agreements, suspensions without pay, transfers to less sensitive positions, and limitations on overseas assignments.

The DOD investigative files that were reviewed did not have information on adjudicative outcomes. Some information on adjudicative outcomes was obtained from the Defense Central Index of Investigations (DCII). Codes signifying the most serious SSBI-PRs for DOD include the following: F, G, H, L, M, N, R, Y, Z, 3, 4, 6, and 7. The only codes represented in the source productivity sample were Y and Z. The code of "Y" signifies access suspended pending final adjudication. The Z code signifies adjudication action incomplete due to loss of jurisdiction, which generally means the individual resigned before the clearance was revoked. The Central Adjudication Facilities (CAFs) occasionally take actions such as warnings or reprimands that are not reported in the DCII. Since CAF files were not checked, these outcomes are not included in the study. Adjudicative outcomes were also not available for OPM, as adjudication of OPM investigations is done by the diverse organizations that OPM services. As a surrogate for actionable outcomes in OPM cases, the analysis uses OPM coding of case severity. OPM case severity codes B, C, D, and J identify the more serious cases in which some action may have been taken.

For CIA and NRO, the investigative files do contain information on adjudicative outcomes. The nature of the action was coded as shown in the files. At CIA this included all

cases that CIA coded as APPN. Neither the CIA nor the NRO samples had any cases of termination, revocation, or resignation to avoid sanction. It was determined after the coding was completed that such cases had been removed from the active files from which the sample cases were taken. These cases were reviewed separately.

Data Analysis

To accurately interpret source-productivity findings presented in Tables 3, 4, 5, and 7, it is necessary to know how the figures were calculated. Rather than representing the yield of each individual source (e.g., an individual LAC, an individual Credit Report, etc.), source-yield was instead conceptualized at the case-level. All figures shown for source-yields in these tables reflect the yield *not* of each individual source in an SSBI-PR, but rather the yield of each *source type* in an SSBI-PR. While there may have been numerous LACs in the periodic reinvestigation, for example, or perhaps two Listed References, the frequencies reflect the number of *cases* in which one or more LACs provided Issue-Relevant Information, or the number of *cases* in which one or more Listed References provided Issue-Relevant Information, and so forth. Additionally, the percentages shown in tables 3 and 5 reflect the number of SSBI-PRs in which the source type provided information, divided by the number of SSBI-PRs where that source type was included (rather than dividing by the total number of SSBI-PRs coded for that site). Due to coder error in failing to include a source type when it actually was in the SSBI-PR, it would have been possible to underestimate source yields using the total number of SSBI-PRs as the divisor. For example, at NRO coders included the SF-86/SPHS in 99% of the SSBI-PRs they coded, even though we are fairly certain that 100% of the SSBI-PRs actually contained an SF-86/SPHS. By using the number of cases in which the coders *included* the SF-86/SPHS as the denominator, we have a lesser risk of underestimating the information yield of the personnel security questionnaire. Also, for source types such as Medical Interviews and Ex-Spouse Interviews, it would have distorted the results to use all SSBI-PRs as the denominator rather than only using cases where the source was contacted because these sources are used for a relatively small portion of all SSBI-PRs. Finally, Tables 8 and 9 represent a distinctly different analytical approach whereby source information-yields are conceptualized at the source level (rather than at the case-level). For the cost-benefit analysis, source productivity is measured in terms of “items of Issue-Relevant Information yielded” rather than cases containing Issue-Relevant Information.

Results

Demographic Information

Demographic characteristics of the four samples are somewhat varied due to differences in the types of personnel employed by the organizations. Table 1 shows the figures for the demographic variables that were used in this investigation.

Whereas DOD and OPM personnel included contractors, civilians, and military personnel, the CIA sample (by design) was comprised entirely of staff personnel and the NRO sample was nearly all contractors (95%). DOD has a slightly younger sample; the average age for DOD personnel was 43, whereas the average age for OPM, CIA, and NRO personnel ranged from 48 to 50. The age of Subjects overall appears relatively high because all personnel in the samples were being reinvestigated after at least five years of service.

Table 1
Demographic Information ^a

	<i>DOD</i> (n=1611)		<i>OPM</i> (n=1332)		<i>CIA</i> (n=855)		<i>NRO</i> (n=923)	
	<i>n</i>	%	<i>n</i>	%	<i>n</i>	%	<i>n</i>	%
Age								
less than 30	131	8%	18	1%	0	0%	172	19%
31 – 40	622	39%	278	21%	101	12%	313	34%
41 – 50	522	32%	488	37%	387	45%	330	36%
51 – 60	278	17%	451	34%	318	37%	105	11%
61 or older	55	3%	91	7%	41	5%	0	0%
Unknown	3	<1%	6	<1%	8	1%	3	<1%
Sex								
Female	233	14%	284	21%	398	47%	157	17%
Male	1378	86%	1047	79%	457	53%	765	83%
Unknown	0	0%	1	<1%	0	0%	1	<1%
Employee Type								
Contractor	233	14%	1002	75%	0	0%	880	95%
Civilian	458	28%	306	23%	855	100%	24	3%
Military Enlisted	418	26%	0	0%	0	0%	3	<1%
Military Officer	484	30%	1	<1%	0	0%	16	2%
Unknown	18	1%	23	2%	0	0%	0	0%
Citizenship								
Born U.S. citizen	1553	96%	1302	98%	845	99%	911	99%
Naturalized	24	1%	30	2%	10	1%	12	1%
Unknown	34	2%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Marital Status								
Married	1268	79%	1001	75%	606	71%	687	74%
Single	165	10%	109	8%	109	13%	78	8%
Divorced	112	7%	175	13%	86	10%	66	7%
Separated	23	1%	17	1%	15	2%	11	1%
Widowed	10	1%	7	1%	16	2%	9	1%
Unknown	33	2%	23	2%	23	3%	72	8%

^a Percentages may not total 100% due to rounding.

Cases With Adjudicative Information

SSBI-PRs were categorized as to whether they contained Issue-Relevant Information and/or were considered serious or “actionable” by the organization. As shown in Figure 1, the proportion of SSBI-PRs with Issue-Relevant Information (i.e., Potential Issue Cases) ranges from 23% at DOD to 35% of cases coded at CIA. A second means of distinguishing cases is whether the organization took action of some kind on the basis of adverse information in the SSBI-PR. The proportion of Actionable Cases ranges from approximately 1% at DOD to 5% of all cases at CIA.




Figure 1. Cases With Adjudicative Information

Types of Issues and Frequency

Table 2 shows the proportion of SSBI-PRs that contain one or more items of Issue-Relevant Information for each of the 13 adjudicative areas. The figures illustrate the extent to which the various issue types are present in periodic reinvestigations. For example, Financial Considerations are reported most frequently – by at least one source type in 33% to 59% of Potential Issue Cases for the four organizations. In contrast, Issue-Relevant Information pertaining to Allegiance to the United States, Foreign Preference, and Outside Activities issues was yielded in 1% or less of all Potential Issue Cases for all organizations. Because PRs often contain Issue-Relevant Information for multiple types of issues, the number of cases with each type of Issue-Relevant Information exceeds the total number of cases containing Issue-Relevant Information.

Table 2
Types of Adjudicative Issues and Frequency^a

	DOD (n=375)		OPM (n=450)		CIA (n=298)		NRO (n=287)	
	Cases	%	Cases	%	Cases	%	Cases	%
Alcohol Consumption	46	12%	46	10%	17	6%	13	5%
Allegiance to U.S.	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Criminal Conduct	52	14%	96	21%	17	6%	16	6%
Drug Involvement	13	3%	19	4%	2	1%	4	1%
Emotional/Mental	41	11%	82	18%	55	18%	34	12%
Financial Considerations	198	53%	267	59%	98	33%	108	38%
Foreign Influence	69	18%	63	14%	73	24%	91	32%
Foreign Preference	1	<1%	0	0%	1	<1%	0	0%
Misuse of IT Systems	3	1%	1	<1%	12	4%	24	8%
Outside Activities	1	<1%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Personal Conduct	79	21%	50	11%	54	18%	29	10%
Security Violations	25	7%	6	1%	92	31%	52	18%
Sexual Behavior	12	3%	8	2%	7	2%	1	<1%

^a Because periodic reinvestigations often contain Issue-Relevant Information pertaining to multiple issue areas, the number of cases with each type of issue information exceeds the total number of Potential Issue Cases.

Source Types Yielding Issue-Relevant Information

The primary measure of source information-yield used in this study was whether the source type provided Issue-Relevant Information. Table 3 shows, for example, that the SF-86/SPHS yielded Issue-Relevant Information in 15% of the 1,313 cases at OPM in which the SF-86/SPHS was included. (The actual number of cases in which the sources provided Issue-Relevant Information are shown in *Appendix F*.) The SF-86/SPHS and the Subject Interview emerge as the most productive sources for the four organizations. Slightly lesser information is yielded by the SPHS (administered by the CIA) as it is a shorter questionnaire. Among the most valuable Records Sources are Credit Reports, Public Records and Medical Records. Finally, among Interviews of Others, Ex-Spouse Interviews and Medical Interviews yield the greatest Issue-Relevant Information.

Table 3
Cases in Which Source Type Yielded Issue-Relevant Information ^a

	DOD (n=1611)		OPM (n=1332)		CIA (n=855)		NRO (n=923)	
	Cases	%	Cases	%	Cases	%	Cases	%
Self-Report Sources								
SF-86/SPHS	1506	11%	1313	15%	847	5%	915	10%
Subject Interview	1546	15%	1312	18%	828	23%	911	25%
Records Sources								
Credit Reports	1557	11%	1311	18%	838	10%	915	9%
NAC/Subjects	1586	3%	1270	3%	842	<1%	911	<1%
NAC/Spouse-Cohabitants	152	0%	823	2%	462	<1%	726	1%
LACs	1560	2%	1307	3%	842	1%	914	<1%
Employment Records	428	2%	1258	1%	56	0%	898	1%
Military Records	51	4%	12	0%	2	0%	50	0%
Security Records	80	8%	146	4%	9	56%	708	2%
Title 31 Records	1611	<1%	1332	1%	855	0%	923	0%
Medical Records	18	28%	3	67%	11	64%	24	54%
Education Records	7	0%	66	0%	38	0%	51	0%
Public Records	210	18%	238	26%	82	13%	127	6%
Residence Records	243	1%	107	4%	78	1%	52	0%
Miscellaneous Records	83	18%	33	12%	13	23%	22	9%
Interviews of Others								
Coworker Interviews	1054	1%	1258	3%	800	3%	884	1%
Supervisor Interviews	1230	3%	806	5%	833	5%	859	2%
Listed References	791	1%	131	1%	770	3%	843	1%
Developed References	1560	2%	92	0%	810	3%	894	1%
Residence Interviews	1437	<1%	1306	2%	788	1%	912	1%
Ex-Spouse Interviews	94	16%	72	24%	14	29%	38	29%
Medical Interviews	51	31%	3	0%	30	57%	19	53%
Area Security Managers	---	---	---	---	12	67%	---	---
Miscellaneous Interviews	4	0%	7	29%	7	0%	11	9%

^a Percentages represent the proportion of cases in which the source type provided Issue-Relevant Information, out of all cases in which the source type was included.

Source Categories Yielding Issue-Relevant Information

In addition to assessing the productivity of source types (Table 3), the overall information-yields of the three broad categories of sources were also assessed. The figures shown in Table 4 represent the number of cases in which Self-Report Sources, Records Sources or Interviews of Others yielded Issue-Relevant Information. For example, at DOD, one or more Self-Report Sources yielded Issue-Relevant Information in 285 SSBI-PRs for an overall yield of 18%.

Table 4
Cases in Which Self-Report Sources, Records Sources
and Interviews of Others Yielded Issue-Relevant Information

	DOD (n=1611)		OPM (n=1332)		CIA (n=855)		NRO (n=923)	
	Cases	%	Cases	%	Cases	%	Cases	%
Self-Report Sources	285	18%	286	21%	222	26%	258	28%
Records Sources	224	14%	310	23%	132	15%	114	12%
Interviews of Others	81	5%	88	7%	94	11%	63	7%

Source Types Yielding Mitigating Information

In addition to collecting data regarding source yields of Issue-Relevant Information, data were gathered regarding source yields of Mitigating Information – information that tends to explain or refute Issue-Relevant Information. Table 5 shows the number of cases in which source types yielded Mitigating Information. For example, at NRO the Subject Interview yielded Mitigating Information in 31% of the 911 cases in which the coders included it. (The actual number of cases in which the source types provided Mitigating Information are shown in *Appendix E*.)

The most productive sources of Mitigating Information include the SF-86/SPHS and the Subject Interview. The most productive Records Sources are Credit Reports, Medical Records, Public Records and Miscellaneous Records. Interviews of Others that yield the greatest Mitigating Information are Ex-Spouse Interviews and Medical Interviews. Given that Mitigating Information is usually only provided when issue information is also provided, it is unsurprising that the most productive sources of Mitigating Information are to some extent, the same source types providing issue information the most frequently.

Table 5
Cases in Which Source Type Yielded Mitigating Information ^a

	<i>DOD</i> (n=1611)		<i>OPM</i> (n=1332)		<i>CIA</i> (n=855)		<i>NRO</i> (n=923)	
	Cases	%	Cases	%	Cases	%	Cases	%
Self-Report Sources								
SF-86/SPHS	1506	9%	1313	21%	847	4%	915	10%
Subject Interview	1546	25%	1312	32%	828	23%	911	31%
Records Sources								
Credit Reports	1557	4%	1311	24%	838	7%	915	11%
NAC/Subjects	1586	3%	1270	13%	842	0%	911	<1%
NAC/Spouse-Cohabitants	152	<1%	823	4%	462	<1%	726	0%
LACs	1560	1%	1307	6%	842	1%	914	<1%
Employment Records	428	1%	1258	1%	56	0%	898	1%
Military Records	51	2%	12	17%	2	0%	50	0%
Security Records	80	4%	146	3%	9	22%	708	1%
Title 31 Records	1611	0%	1332	<1%	855	0%	923	0%
Medical Records	18	22%	3	67%	11	73%	24	42%
Education Records	7	0%	66	0%	38	0%	51	0%
Public Records	210	10%	238	21%	82	7%	127	5%
Residence Records	243	0%	107	4%	78	1%	52	0%
Miscellaneous Records	83	14%	33	12%	13	15%	22	18%
Interviews of Others								
Coworker Interviews	1054	1%	1258	2%	800	2%	884	1%
Supervisor Interviews	1230	3%	806	3%	833	2%	859	2%
Listed References	791	1%	131	5%	770	2%	843	1%
Developed References	1560	1%	92	1%	810	2%	894	<1%
Residence Interviews	1437	<1%	1306	2%	788	1%	912	<1%
Ex-Spouse Interviews	94	10%	72	14%	14	7%	38	8%
Medical Interviews	51	43%	3	0%	30	63%	19	74%
Area Security Managers	---	---	---	---	12	17%	---	---
Miscellaneous Interviews	4	0%	7	14%	7	14%	11	0%

^a Percentages represent the proportion of cases in which the source type provided Mitigating Information, out of all cases in which the source type was included.

Average Number of Issue-Relevant Source Types Per Case

Another finding of the source yields analyses is that when one source type provides Issue-Relevant Information in a PR, very frequently additional source types yield Issue-Relevant Information about the same or different adjudicative issues. The average number of source types that provide Issue-Relevant Information in Potential Issue Cases ranges from 1.9 to 2.5 (Table 6).

Table 6
Average Number of Issue-Relevant Source Types
In Potential Issue Cases

<i>DOD</i> (n=375)	<i>OPM</i> (n=450)	<i>CIA</i> (n=298)	<i>NRO</i> (n=287)
2.3	2.2	2.5	1.9

Source Types Yielding the Only Issue-Relevant Information

While it is clear that some source types are more productive than others in terms of yielding Issue-Relevant and Mitigating Information in SSBI-PRs, it is possible that some source types – while yielding less information overall – may yield particularly important information. Table 7 shows the reinvestigative sources that provided Issue-Relevant Information in SSBI-PRs where no other source types did. For example, at CIA there were 128 cases in which only one type of source yielded Issue-Relevant Information. In 61 (48%) of these periodic reinvestigations, the Subject Interview was the *only* source of Issue-Relevant Information. Source types that provided the only Issue-Relevant Information in 3% or less of Issue-Relevant cases are not shown.

Table 7
Cases in Which Source Type Yielded
the Only Issue-Relevant Information^a

	<i>DOD</i> (n=147)		<i>OPM</i> (n=193)		<i>CIA</i> (n=128)		<i>NRO</i> (n=112)	
	<i>Cases</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Cases</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Cases</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Cases</i>	<i>%</i>
SF-86/SPHS	23	16%	31	16%	8	6%	8	7%
Subject Interview	42	29%	26	13%	61	48%	57	51%
Credit Reports	52	35%	108	56%	24	19%	14	13%
NAC Subject	12	8%	7	4%	1	1%	0	0%

^a Source types not listed in Table 7 provided Issue-Relevant Information in 3% or less of cases where only one source type provided Issue-Relevant Information.

Best Sources Of Issue-Relevant Information for Certain Issues

While some types of sources are clearly more valuable than others with regard to yielding Issue-Relevant Information in general, it is also true that some types of sources are more productive than others in terms of providing information about specific kinds of adjudicative issues. *Appendix F* shows source types that are most productive in yielding Issue-Relevant Information for each of the 13 adjudicative areas.

Cost-Benefit Analysis: Cost Versus Items of Issue-Relevant Information Yielded

Data from a 1997 DSS study (Mitchell, 1999) were used to explore the relationship between source productivity and cost. As cost data were not available for a few sources, these sources are not included in the "Cost" or the "Benefit" figures shown in Table 8. The cost-benefit analysis clearly demonstrates that the least productive sources, Interviews of Others, are the most expensive. Interviews of Others produced 131 items of Issue-Relevant Information out of a total of 952 items (the number of items from all sources shown in the table), and yet constitute 61% of the total cost of a PR. While not reported below, Residence Interviews (under Interviews of Others), yielded only 1 item (less than 1%) of Issue-Relevant Information for all cases, yet comprise 27% of the total cost of conducting periodic reinvestigations.

In contrast to Interviews of Others, the Subject Interview & SF-86/SPHS (Self-Report Sources), represent 26% of the total cost of the DOD periodic reinvestigation (not including the time it takes the Subject to complete the questionnaire), but produce 56% of all Issue-Relevant Information. Finally, Records Sources are relatively productive and are also relatively inexpensive; Records Sources generate 31% of all Issue-Relevant Information in the PR, and yet only comprise 12% of the total resources.

Table 8
Cost Versus Items of Issue-Relevant Information Yielded (DOD)^a

Source Categories	Cost: Portion of Total Cost of the PR	Benefit: Portion of Issue-Relevant Information Yielded (total items = 952)
Self-Report Sources: SF-86/SPHS & Subject Interview	26%	56% (530 items)
Records Sources: Credit Reports, NAC/Subjects, NAC/Spouse-Cohabitants, LACs, Employment Records & Education Records	12%	31% (291 items)
Interviews of Others: Coworker Interviews, Supervisor Interviews, Listed References, Developed References, & Residence Interviews	61%	14% (131 items)

^a Because the cost-benefit analysis only includes sources for which both source-productivity *and* cost data were available, a few sources are not included in Table 8. Percentages may not total 100% due to rounding.

Table 9 provides source-productivity data for the remaining three organizations so that cost-benefit analyses can be performed if desired. For example, out of a total of 1,265 items of Issue-Relevant Information yielded in the OPM periodic reinvestigations that were included in this study, the SF-86/SPHS and Subject Interview yielded a total of 527 items, or 42% of all items.

Table 9
Items of Issue-Relevant Information
Yielded by Each Source Category (OPM, CIA & NRO)^a

Source Categories	OPM Portion of Issue-Relevant Information Yielded (out of 1,265 total items)	CIA Portion of Issue-Relevant Information Yielded (out of 584 total items)	NRO Portion of Issue-Relevant Information Yielded (out of 613 total items)
Self-Report Sources: SF-86/SPHS & Subject Interview	42% (527 items)	50% (290 items)	60% (367 items)
Records Sources: Credit Reports, NAC/Subjects, NAC/Spouse-Cohabitants, LACs, Employment Records, Military Records, Security Records, Title 31 Records, Medical Records, Education Records, Public Records, Residence Records & Miscellaneous Records	43% (543 items)	23% (133 items)	26% (159 items)
Interviews of Others: Coworker Interviews, Supervisor Interviews, Listed References, Developed References, Residence Interviews, Ex-Spouse Interviews, Medical Interviews, Area Security Managers & Miscellaneous Interviews	15% (195 items)	28% (161 items)	14% (87 items)

^a Percentages may not total 100% due to rounding.

Identification of Potential Issue Cases and Actionable Cases

As shown in previously presented source productivity tables, the three most productive sources are the SF-86/SPHS, the Subject Interview, and the Credit Report. In addition to yielding information most often, analyses conducted for this study also demonstrate that these sources have the unique capacity to *identify* nearly all PRs with Issue-Relevant Information. That is to

say, in cases containing Issue-Relevant Information – from a few or even a multitude of sources – chances are very good that one or more of these three sources will have provided Issue-Relevant Information also. This suggests that these three sources can be used as indicators or “markers” of Potential Issue Cases. The results shown in Table 10 show the capacity of the SF-86/SPHS, the Subject Interview and the Credit Report to identify cases containing Issue-Relevant Information from any source(s).

Table 10
Ability of the SF-86/SPHS, Subject Interview &
Credit Report (Combined) to Identify Potential Issue Cases

	DOD	OPM	CIA	NRO
Percentage of Potential Issue Cases Identified	93%	92%	87%	95%
Percentage of Actionable Cases Identified	100%	92%	95%	95%

As presented, the three most productive sources accurately identified from 87% to 95% of the cases in which a full reinvestigation turned up Issue-Relevant Information based upon the 4,721 cases comprising the productivity of sources database. Additionally, these three sources alone accurately identified between 92% and 100% of all cases in which the organization took some sort of administrative action.

Conclusions

A number of important findings emerged from this study. The level of consistency in SSBI-PR source productivity across the four organizations is noteworthy. Despite a wide diversity of personnel (ranging from contractors at NRO to active-duty military and government civilians at DOD), the relative yield of information across the different reinvestigative sources is remarkably similar; the most valuable sources are the same for all organizations. This suggests that if improvements to the SSBI-PR were developed, insofar as these improvements reflect consistencies in relative source information-yields, they could potentially be implemented across the security community. Additional key findings of this study include the following:

- The majority of SSBI-PRs do not contain serious adverse information. Only 23% to 35% of the SSBI-PRs used in this study (depending on the organization) contained Issue-Relevant Information.

- Only 1% to 5% of SSBI-PRs result in actionable outcomes by the adjudicative agencies (e.g., the adjudicative decision resulted in specific actions such as monitoring, waivers, administrative sanctions, etc.).
- The most common adjudicative issue resulting from information in SSBI-PRs is Financial Considerations. The percentage of Potential Issue Cases in which one or more sources yielded Issue-Relevant Information for Financial Considerations ranges from 33% to 59%.
- Self-Report Sources (i.e., the SF-86/SPHS and Subject Interview) yield more information than do Records Sources or Interviews of Others. Subjects provide relatively large amounts of issue and mitigating information about themselves.
- Self-Report Sources and Records Sources combined yield 87% of the Issue-Relevant Information but comprise only 38% of the total cost of the PR. In contrast, Interviews of Others yield 14% of all Issue-Relevant Information, yet represent 61% of the total cost of the PR (DOD figures).
- The SF-86/SPHS, Credit Report and the Subject Interview are the most productive reinvestigative sources, and when combined, accurately identify 87% to 95% of Potential Issue Cases and 92% to 100% of Actionable Cases

Taken together, these findings provide the starting point for designing an improved process for conducting the SSBI-PR. Data from this study clearly suggest that we are not using our reinvestigative sources in the most efficient and effective manner. The implications of these findings, as well as additional analyses using the productivity of sources databases, are presented in a second report: *A New Approach to the SSBI-PR: Assessment of a Phased Reinvestigation*. This study demonstrates how a phased reinvestigative process can be used to achieve a more effective reinvestigation program on a community-wide scale.

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Appendix A
Investigative Standard C: Single-Scope Background Investigation
-Periodic Reinvestigations (SSBI-PRs)

Appendix A
Investigative Standard C
Single-Scope Background Investigation
-Periodic Reinvestigations (SSBI-PRs)

- 1. Applicability.** Standard C applies to reinvestigations for (a) access to TOP SECRET (including TOP SECRET Special Access Programs) and Sensitive Compartmented Information; and (b) "Q" access authorizations.
- 2. When to Reinvestigate.** The reinvestigation may be initiated at any time following completion of, but not later than five years from the date of, the previous investigation.
- 3. Reinvestigative Requirements.** Reinvestigative requirements are as follows:
 - (a) Completion of Forms:** Completion of Standard Form 86, including applicable releases and supporting documentation.
 - (b) National Agency Check:** Completion of a National Agency Check (fingerprint cards are required only if there has not been a previous valid technical check by the FBI).
 - (c) National Agency Check for the Spouse or Cohabitant (if applicable):** Completion of a National Agency Check, without fingerprint cards, for the spouse or cohabitant. The National Agency Check for the spouse or cohabitant is not required if already completed in conjunction with a previous investigation or reinvestigation.
 - (d) Employment:** Verification of all employments since the last investigation. Attempts to interview a sufficient number of sources (supervisors, coworkers, or both) at all employments of six months or more. For military members, all service within one branch of the armed forces will be considered as one employment, regardless of assignments.
 - (e) References:** Interviews with two character references who are knowledgeable of the Subject; at least one will be a developed reference. To the extent practical, both should have social knowledge of the Subject and collectively span the entire period of the reinvestigation. As appropriate, additional interviews may be conducted with cohabitants and relatives.
 - (f) Neighborhoods:** Interviews of two neighbors in the vicinity of the Subject's most recent residence of six months or more. Confirmation of current residence regardless of length.

(g) Financial Review:

(1) Financial Status: Verification of the Subject's financial status, including credit bureau checks covering all locations where Subject has resided, been employed and/or attended school for six months or more for the period covered by the reinvestigation;

(2) Check of Treasury's Financial Data Base: Agencies may request the Department of the Treasury, under terms and conditions prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury, to search automated data bases consisting of reports of currency transactions by financial institutions, international transportation of currency or monetary instruments, foreign bank and financial accounts and transactions under \$10,000 that are reported as possible money laundering violations.

(h) Local Agency Checks: A check of appropriate criminal history records covering all locations where, during the period covered by the reinvestigation, the Subject has resided, been employed and/or attended school for six months or more, including current residence regardless of duration. (NOTE: If no residence, employment or education exceeds six months, local agency checks should be performed as deemed appropriate.)

(i) Former Spouse. An interview with any former spouse unless the divorce took place before the date of the last investigation or reinvestigation.

(j) Public Records: Verification of divorces, bankruptcies and other court actions, whether civil or criminal, involving the Subject since the date of the last investigation.

(k) Subject Interview: A subject interview, conducted by trained security, investigative, or counterintelligence personnel. During the reinvestigation, additional subject interviews may be conducted to collect Relevant Information, to resolve significant inconsistencies, or both. Sworn statements and unsworn declarations may be taken whenever appropriate.

4. Expanding the Reinvestigation. The reinvestigation may be expanded as necessary. As appropriate, interviews may be conducted with anyone able to provide information or to resolve issues, including but not limited to cohabitants, relatives, psychiatrists, psychologists, other medical professionals and law enforcement professionals.

Appendix B
Sample MS Access[®] Data-Collection Forms (DOD)

Appendix B
Sample MS Access[®] Data-Collection Forms (DOD)

Subject Information Screen

The screenshot shows a Microsoft Access form titled "Demographics : Form". The main title is "Subject Information". The form contains the following data entries:

Today's Date:	5/10/01	YOB:	45
CODER:	Jones	Sex:	M
CCN (Stamped):	555	Employee type:	1
SIN:	123-45-6789	Investigating Agency:	2
Current Marital Status:	1	Case Type:	
Last Marriage Termination Date:	12/12/45		
Citizenship:	2		

Below the form, a note reads: "NOTE: Once you begin entering data for a new case you must finish it before beginning or editing another case." At the bottom of the screen, the Windows taskbar shows icons for Start, Inbox, Microsoft Word, RE: EE 12968, Microsoft Access, and Methods Draft 5, along with the date 3/18 AM.

Source Selection Screen

Microsoft Access - [SourceSelection : Form]

File Edit View Insert Format Records Tools Window Help

Source Selection

Sources

PSQ/SF86
Subject Interview
Education Records
Employment Records
Security Manager Interview
Developed Reference/Work
Developed Reference/Social
Developed Reference/Residence
Listed Reference/Work
Listed Reference/Social
Listed Reference/Residence
Residence Records
Ex-Spouse Interview
Relative Interview
Medical Records
Medical Interview
Credit Report
Title 31 Records

Source Date

Source Type

Completed Sources:

CCN	SRC_NUM	Source	Date	Issue	Positive
7348	(AutoNumber)			No	No

Form View

Office Start Microsoft Word Microsoft Access Microsoft Outlook Microsoft Word Microsoft Access Microsoft Outlook 12:08 PM

Issues Information Screen

Microsoft Access - [Issues : Form]

File Edit View Insert Format Records Tools Window Help

Issues Information

INSTRUCTIONS: Single-click on the button to the right of the issue to enter further information about that issue.

<input type="checkbox"/> Alcohol	Alcohol >	<input type="checkbox"/> Foreign Preference	Preference >
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Allegiance	Allegiance >	<input type="checkbox"/> Misuse of information technology systems	Misuse >
<input type="checkbox"/> Criminal Conduct	Criminal >	<input type="checkbox"/> Outside Activities	Outside >
<input type="checkbox"/> Drug involvement	Drugs >	<input type="checkbox"/> Personal Conduct	Conduct >
<input type="checkbox"/> Emotional, mental and personality disorders	Emotional >	<input type="checkbox"/> Security Violations	Security >
<input type="checkbox"/> Financial	Financial >	<input type="checkbox"/> Sexual Behavior	Sexual >
<input type="checkbox"/> Foreign Influence	Influence >		


« Sources | Create Client | »

Form View


Office Microsoft Microsoft

Start Microsoft Word Inbox - Microsoft Outlook Microsoft Access Inbox - Microsoft Outlook 12:09 PM

Alcohol Consumption Screen



Rating Issues Screen



Appendix C
Inter-Coder Reliability Assessments

Appendix C

Inter-Coder Reliability Assessments

To assess coding consistency, tests of inter-coder reliability were conducted at each of the four sites. Measuring inter-coder reliability involved calculating the degree to which all possible pairings of coders assigned the same values to the same variables when coding the same SSBI-PR. Findings from the two methods employed -- percent agreement and the computation of a kappa coefficient -- indicate that coding agreement for the variables used in this study are within commonly accepted standards of consistency (Shrout & Fleiss, 1979; Tinsley & Weiss, 1975).

Five SSBI-PRs were randomly selected from each organization's case files for the inter-coder reliability assessment. Each coder completed the five test cases privately and in the same order about halfway through the coding effort at each organization. For the inter-coder reliability analyses, each pair of coders' responses were compared for a variety of variables (including variables for which data were collected but which were not used in this particular study, such as "Case Contained Relevant Information" and "Source Type Yielded Relevant Information"). While the demographic variables used in this study required minimal judgment on behalf of the coders (i.e., Sex, Marital Status and Citizenship), the remaining items required considerable evaluation.

Two measures of inter-coder reliability were used to test the degree of inter-coder consistency: percent agreement and kappa. Percent agreement reflects the average number of times that two coders agreed on a coding response out of the times in which the two could have agreed. Kappa, a more complex computation, also reflects the number of comparisons that were made and the number of agreements among those comparisons, but additionally considers the number of agreements we would see on average if coders had made their selections randomly according to their usual coding patterns. Calculating kappa relies on our being able to estimate separately, for each rater, his or her tendency to code certain items in certain ways. With this information, kappa is computed as follows:

Let p_o be the observed proportion of agreements, so $p_o = \text{Agreements} / \text{Comparisons}$

Let p_e be the expected proportion of agreements, so $p_e = \text{Expected Agreements} / \text{Comparisons}$

Then, $\text{kappa} = (p_o - p_e) / (1 - p_e)$

Supposing that all cases completed by Coder A showed a gender distribution of 65% male and 35% female, and that Coder B showed a pattern of 55% male and 45% female for the coding of the sex variable. The pair-wise comparison for kappa considers these coding patterns when assessing agreement for the comparison SSBI-PRs. If the two raters in this comparison agree on all five responses, p_o will be 1 and therefore kappa will be 1 regardless of p_e . However, if the two raters agree on only four of the five test cases (in one instance one coder says "female" when the other codes the SSBI-PR as "male"), the expected probability of a match is computed as follows: the probability that Coder A chooses "male" and that Coder B chooses "male" is $(.65)(.55) = .3575$, and the probability that Coder A chooses "female" and Coder B chooses

“female” is $(.35)(.45) = .1575$. Thus, the overall probability of a random match is .515. Of course the observed proportion of matches is $4/5 = .80$, which makes kappa: $(.80 - .515)/(1 - .515) = 0.59$. Thus, kappa will always be equal to or smaller than the percent agreement because it assumes that if the raters were choosing at random they would still agree more than 50% of the time. Finally, because we had more than two coders in each comparison, the numbers of coder comparisons, agreements, and expected agreements were aggregated over all possible pairs, and then kappa was computed as stipulated above.

Table C-1 shows the findings of the inter-coder reliability assessments that were conducted for each of the four organizations.

Table C.1
Inter-coder Reliability: Percent Agreement and Kappa

<i>IRR Item</i>	DOD		OPM		CIA		NRO	
	<i>Percent Agreement</i>	<i>Kappa</i>						
Sex	100%	1.00	100%	1.00	91%	.82	100%	1.00
Marital Status	92%	.80	93%	.84	83%	.63	76%	.47
Citizenship	100%	1.00	100%	1.00	94%	1.11	100%	1.00
Case Contained Relevant Information	100%	1.00	100%	1.00	100%	1.00	83%	.65
Source Type Yielded Relevant Information	89%	.83	93%	.87	90%	.58	89%	.67
Source Type Yielded Issue-Relevant Information	83%	.80	96%	.91	92%	.65	90%	.68

Appendix D
Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility
for Access to Classified Information

Appendix D

Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information

This is the full text of the guidelines as approved by the President per March 24, 1997 memorandum from the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

A. Introduction

The following adjudicative guidelines are established for all U.S. government civilian and military personnel, consultants, contractors, employees of contractors, licensees, certificate holders or grantees and their employees and other individuals who require access to classified information. They apply to persons being considered for initial or continued eligibility for access to classified information, to include sensitive compartmented information (SCI) and special access programs (SAPs) and are to be used by government departments and agencies in all final clearance determinations.

B. Adjudicative Process

1. The adjudicative process is an examination of a sufficient period of a person's life to make an affirmative determination that the person is eligible for a security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is predicated upon the individual meeting these personnel security guidelines. The adjudicative process is the careful weighing of a number of variables known as the whole person concept. Available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, should be considered in reaching a determination. In evaluating the relevance of an individual's conduct, the adjudicator should consider the following factors:
 - a. The nature, extent and seriousness of the conduct;
 - b. The circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation;
 - c. The frequency and recency of the conduct;
 - d. The individual's age and maturity at the time of the conduct;
 - e. The voluntariness of participation;
 - f. The presence or absence of rehabilitation and other pertinent behavioral changes;
 - g. The motivation for the conduct;
 - h. The potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and
 - i. The likelihood of continuation or recurrence.
2. Each case must be judged on its own merits and final determination remains the responsibility of the specific department or agency. Any doubt as to whether access to classified information is clearly consistent with national security will be resolved in favor of the national security.
3. The ultimate determination of whether the granting or continuing of eligibility for a security clearance is clearly consistent with the interests of national security must be an overall common sense determination based upon careful consideration of the following, each of which is to be evaluated in the context of the whole person, as explained further below:
 - a. Guideline A: Allegiance to the United States
 - b. Guideline B: Foreign influence
 - c. Guideline C: Foreign preference
 - d. Guideline D: Sexual behavior

- e. Guideline E: Personal conduct
- f. Guideline F: Financial considerations
- g. Guideline G: Alcohol consumption
- h. Guideline H: Drug involvement
- i. Guideline I: Emotional, mental, and personality disorders
- j. Guideline J: Criminal conduct
- k. Guideline K: Security violations
- l. Guideline L: Outside activities
- m. Guideline M: Misuse of information technology systems

4. Although adverse information concerning a single criterion may not be sufficient for an unfavorable determination, the individual may be disqualified if available information reflects a recent or recurring pattern of questionable judgment, irresponsibility, or emotionally unstable behavior. Notwithstanding the whole person concept, pursuit of further investigation may be terminated by an appropriate adjudicative agency in the face of reliable, significant, disqualifying, adverse information.

5. When information of security concern becomes known about an individual who is currently eligible for access to classified information, the adjudicator should consider whether the person:

- a. Voluntarily reported the information;
- b. Was truthful and complete in responding to questions;
- c. Sought assistance and followed professional guidance, where appropriate;
- d. Resolved or appears likely to favorably resolve the security concern;
- e. Has demonstrated positive changes in behavior and employment;
- f. Should have his or her access temporarily suspended pending final adjudication of the information.

6. If after evaluating information of security concern, the adjudicator decides that the information is not serious enough to warrant a recommendation of disapproval or revocation of the security clearance, it may be appropriate to recommend approval with a warning that future incidents of a similar nature may result in revocation of access.

Guideline A: Allegiance to the United States

The Concern. An individual must be of unquestioned allegiance to the United States. The willingness to safeguard classified information is in doubt if there is any reason to suspect an individual's allegiance to the United States.

Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:

- a. Involvement in any act of sabotage, espionage, treason, terrorism, sedition, or other act whose aim is to overthrow the Government of the United States or alter the form of government by unconstitutional means;
- b. Association or sympathy with persons who are attempting to commit, or who are committing, any of the above acts;
- c. Association or sympathy with persons or organizations that advocate the overthrow of the United States Government, or any state or subdivision, by force or violence or by

other unconstitutional means;

d. Involvement in activities which unlawfully advocate or practice the commission of acts of force or violence to prevent others from exercising their rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any state.

Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:

- a. The individual was unaware of the unlawful aims of the individual or organization and severed ties upon learning of these;
- b. The individual's involvement was only with the lawful or humanitarian aspects of such an organization;
- c. Involvement in the above activities occurred for only a short period of time and was attributable to curiosity or academic interest;
- d. The person has had no recent involvement or association with such activities.

Guideline B: Foreign Influence

The Concern. A security risk may exist when an individual's immediate family, including cohabitants, and other persons to whom he or she may be bound by affection, influence, or obligation are not citizens of the United States or may be subject to duress. These situations could create the potential for foreign influence that could result in the compromise of classified information. Contacts with citizens of other countries or financial interests in other countries are also relevant to security determinations if they make an individual potentially vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or pressure.

Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:

- a. An immediate family member, or a person to whom the individual has close ties of affection or obligation, is a citizen of, or resident or present in, a foreign country;
- b. Sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of their citizenship status, if the potential for adverse foreign influence or duress exists;
- c. Relatives, cohabitants, or associates who are connected with any foreign government;
- d. Failing to report, where required, associations with foreign nationals;
- e. Unauthorized association with a suspected or known collaborator or employee of a foreign intelligence service;
- f. Conduct that may make the individual vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or pressure by a foreign government;
- g. Indications that representatives or nationals from a foreign country are acting to increase the vulnerability of the individual to possible future exploitation, coercion or pressure;

- h. A substantial financial interest in a country, or in any foreign owned or operated business that could make the individual vulnerable to foreign influence.

Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:

- a. A determination that the immediate family member(s) (spouse, father, mother, sons, daughters, brothers, sisters), cohabitant, or associate(s) in question are not agents of a foreign power or in a position to be exploited by a foreign power in a way that could force the individual to choose between loyalty to the person(s) involved and the United States;
- b. Contacts with foreign citizens are the result of official U.S. Government business;
- c. Contact and correspondence with foreign citizens are casual and infrequent;
- d. The individual has promptly complied with existing agency requirements regarding the reporting of contacts, requests, or threats from persons or organizations from a foreign country;
- e. Foreign financial interests are minimal and not sufficient to affect the individual's security responsibilities.

Guideline C: Foreign Preference

The Concern. When an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a foreign country over the United States, then he or she may be prone to provide information or make decisions that are harmful to the interests of the United States.

Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:

- a. The exercise of dual citizenship;
- b. Possession and/or use of a foreign passport;
- c. Military service or a willingness to bear arms for a foreign country;
- d. Accepting educational, medical, or other benefits, such as retirement and social welfare, from a foreign country;
- f. Residence in a foreign country to meet citizenship requirements;
- g. Using foreign citizenship to protect financial or business interests in another country;
- h. Seeking or holding political office in the foreign country;
- h. Voting in foreign elections; and
- i. Performing or attempting to perform duties, or otherwise acting, so as to serve the interests of another government in preference to the interests of the United States.

Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:

- a. Dual citizenship is based solely on parents' citizenship or birth in a foreign country;
- b. Indicators of possible foreign preference (e.g., foreign military service) occurred before obtaining United States citizenship;
- c. Activity is sanctioned by the United States;
- d. Individual has expressed a willingness to renounce dual citizenship.

Guideline D: Sexual Behavior

The Concern. Sexual behavior is a security concern if it involves a criminal offense, indicates a personality or emotional disorder, subjects the individual to coercion, exploitation, or duress, or reflects lack of judgment or discretion. (see footnote) Sexual orientation or preference may not be used as a basis for or a disqualifying factor in determining a person's eligibility for a security clearance.

Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:

- a. Sexual behavior of a criminal nature, whether or not the individual has been prosecuted;
- b. Compulsive or addictive sexual behavior when the person is unable to stop a pattern of self-destructive or high-risk behavior or which is symptomatic of a personality disorder;
- c. Sexual behavior that causes an individual to be vulnerable to coercion, exploitation or duress;
- d. Sexual behavior of a public nature and/or which reflects lack of discretion or judgment.

Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:

- a. The behavior occurred during or prior to adolescence and there is no evidence of subsequent conduct of a similar nature;
- b. The behavior was not recent and there is no evidence of subsequent conduct of a similar nature;
- c. There is no other evidence of questionable judgment, irresponsibility, or emotional instability;
- d. The behavior no longer serves as a basis for coercion, exploitation, or duress.

Footnote: The adjudicator should also consider guidelines pertaining to criminal conduct (Guideline J); or emotional, mental, and personality disorders (Guideline I), in determining how to resolve the security concerns raised by sexual behavior.

Guideline E: Personal Conduct

The Concern. Conduct involving questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations could indicate that the person may not properly safeguard classified information. The following will normally result in

an unfavorable clearance action or administrative termination of further processing for clearance eligibility:

- a. Refusal to undergo or cooperate with required security processing, including medical and psychological testing; or
- b. Refusal to complete required security forms, releases, or provide full, frank and truthful answers to lawful questions of investigators, security officials or other official representatives in connection with a personnel security or trustworthiness determination.

Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying also include:

- a. Reliable, unfavorable information provided by associates, employers, coworkers, neighbors, and other acquaintances;
- b. The deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant and material facts from any personnel security questionnaire, personal history statement, or similar form used to conduct investigations, determine employment qualifications, award benefits or status, determine security clearance eligibility or trustworthiness, or award fiduciary responsibilities;
- c. Deliberately providing false or misleading information concerning relevant and material matters to an investigator, security official, competent medical authority, or other official representative in connection with a personnel security or trustworthiness determination;
- d. Personal conduct or concealment of information that may increase an individual's vulnerability to coercion, exploitation or duress, such as engaging in activities which, if known, may affect the person's personal, professional, or community standing or render the person susceptible to blackmail;
- e. A pattern of dishonesty or rule violations, including violation of any written or recorded agreement made between the individual and the agency;
- f. Association with persons involved in criminal activity.

Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:

- a. The information was unsubstantiated or not pertinent to a determination of judgment, trustworthiness, or reliability;
- b. The falsification was an isolated incident, was not recent, and the individual has subsequently provided correct information voluntarily;
- c. The individual made prompt, good-faith efforts to correct the falsification before being confronted with the facts;
- d. Omission of material facts was caused or significantly contributed to by improper or inadequate advice of authorized personnel, and the previously omitted information was promptly and fully provided;

- e. The individual has taken positive steps to significantly reduce or eliminate vulnerability to coercion, exploitation, or duress;
- f. A refusal to cooperate was based on advice from legal counsel or other officials that the individual was not required to comply with security processing requirements and, upon being made aware of the requirement, fully and truthfully provided the requested information;
- g. Association with persons involved in criminal activities has ceased.

Guideline F: Financial Considerations

The Concern. An individual who is financially overextended is at risk of having to engage in illegal acts to generate funds. Unexplained affluence is often linked to proceeds from financially profitable criminal acts.

Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:

- a. A history of not meeting financial obligations;
- b. Deceptive or illegal financial practices such as embezzlement, employee theft, check fraud, income tax evasion, expense account fraud, filing deceptive loan statements, and other intentional financial breaches of trust;
- c. Inability or unwillingness to satisfy debts;
- d. Unexplained affluence;
- e. Financial problems that are linked to gambling, drug abuse, alcoholism, or other issues of security concern.

Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:

- a. The behavior was not recent;
- b. It was an isolated incident;
- c. The conditions that resulted in the behavior were largely beyond the person's control (e.g., loss of employment, a business downturn, unexpected medical emergency, or a death, divorce or separation);
- d. The person has received or is receiving counseling for the problem and there are clear indications that the problem is being resolved or is under control;
- e. The affluence resulted from a legal source; and
- f. The individual initiated a good-faith effort to repay overdue creditors or otherwise resolve debts.

Guideline G: Alcohol Consumption

The Concern. Excessive alcohol consumption often leads to the exercise of questionable judgment, unreliability, failure to control impulses, and increases the risk of unauthorized disclosure of classified information due to carelessness.

Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:

- a. Alcohol-related incidents away from work, such as driving while under the influence, fighting, child or spouse abuse, or other criminal incidents related to alcohol use;
- b. Alcohol-related incidents at work, such as reporting for work or duty in an intoxicated or impaired condition, or drinking on the job;
- c. Diagnosis by a credentialed medical professional (e.g., physician, clinical psychologist, or psychiatrist) of alcohol abuse or alcohol dependence;
- d. Evaluation of alcohol abuse or alcohol dependence by a licensed clinical social worker who is a staff member of a recognized alcohol treatment program;
- e. Habitual or binge consumption of alcohol to the point of impaired judgment;
- f. Consumption of alcohol, subsequent to a diagnosis of alcoholism by a credentialed medical professional and following completion of an alcohol rehabilitation program.

Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:

- a. The alcohol related incidents do not indicate a pattern;
- b. The problem occurred a number of years ago and there is no indication of a recent problem;
- c. Positive changes in behavior supportive of sobriety;
- d. Following diagnosis of alcohol abuse or alcohol dependence, the individual has successfully completed inpatient or outpatient rehabilitation along with aftercare requirements, participates frequently in meetings of Alcoholics Anonymous or a similar organization, has abstained from alcohol for a period of at least 12 months, and received a favorable prognosis by a credentialed medical professional or a licensed clinical social worker who is a staff member of a recognized alcohol treatment program.

Guideline H: Drug Involvement

The Concern.

- a. Improper or illegal involvement with drugs raises questions regarding an individual's willingness or ability to protect classified information. Drug abuse or dependence may impair social or occupational functioning, increasing the risk of an unauthorized disclosure of classified information.

- b. Drugs are defined as mood and behavior altering substances and include:

- (1) Drugs, materials, and other chemical compounds identified and listed in the

Controlled Substances Act of 1970, as amended (e.g., marijuana or cannabis, depressants, narcotics, stimulants, and hallucinogens), and
(2) Inhalants and other similar substances.

c. Drug abuse is the illegal use of a drug or use of a legal drug in a manner that deviates from approved medical direction.

Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:

- a. Any drug abuse (see above definition);
- b. Illegal drug possession, including cultivation, processing, manufacture, purchase, sale, or distribution;
- c. Diagnosis by a credentialed medical professional (e.g., physician, clinical psychologist, or psychiatrist) of drug abuse or drug dependence;
- d. Evaluation of drug abuse or drug dependence by a licensed clinical social worker who is a staff member of a recognized drug treatment program;
- e. Failure to successfully complete a drug treatment program prescribed by a credentialed medical professional. Recent drug involvement, especially following the granting of a security clearance, or an expressed intent not to discontinue use, will almost invariably result in an unfavorable determination.

Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:

- a. The drug involvement was not recent;
- b. The drug involvement was an isolated or aberrational event;
- c. A demonstrated intent not to abuse any drugs in the future;
- d. Satisfactory completion of a prescribed drug treatment program, including rehabilitation and aftercare requirements, without recurrence of abuse, and a favorable prognosis by a credentialed medical professional.

Guideline I: Emotional, Mental, and Personality Disorders

The Concern. Emotional, mental, and personality disorders can cause a significant deficit in an individual's psychological, social and occupational functioning. These disorders are of security concern because they may indicate a defect in judgment, reliability or stability. A credentialed mental health professional (e.g., clinical psychologist or psychiatrist), employed by, acceptable to, or approved by the government, should be utilized in evaluating potentially disqualifying and mitigating information fully and properly, and particularly for consultation with the individual's mental health care provider.

Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:

- a. An opinion by a credentialed mental health professional that the individual has a condition or treatment that may indicate a defect in judgment, reliability, or stability;

- b. Information that suggests that an individual has failed to follow appropriate medical advice relating to treatment of a condition, e.g. failure to take prescribed medication;
- c. A pattern of high-risk, irresponsible, aggressive, anti-social or emotionally unstable behavior;
- d. Information that suggests that the individual's current behavior indicates a defect in his or her judgment or reliability.

Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:

- a. There is no indication of a current problem;
- b. Recent opinion by a credentialed mental health professional that an individual's previous emotional, mental, or personality disorder is cured, under control or in remission and has a low probability of recurrence or exacerbation;
- c. The past emotional instability was a temporary condition (e.g., one caused by a death, illness, or marital breakup), the situation has been resolved, and the individual is no longer emotionally unstable.

Guideline J: Criminal Conduct

The Concern. A history or pattern of criminal activity creates doubt about a person's judgment, reliability and trustworthiness.

Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:

- a. Allegations or admissions of criminal conduct, regardless of whether the person was formally charged;
- b. A single serious crime or multiple lesser offenses.

Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:

- a. The criminal behavior was not recent;
- b. The crime was an isolated incident;
- c. The person was pressured or coerced into committing the act and those pressures are no longer present in that person's life;
- d. The person did not voluntarily commit the act and/or the factors leading to the violation are not likely to recur;
- e. Acquittal;
- f. There is clear evidence of successful rehabilitation.

Guideline K: Security Violations

The Concern: Noncompliance with security regulations raises doubt about an individual's trustworthiness, willingness, and ability to safeguard classified information.

Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:

- a. Unauthorized disclosure of classified information;
- b. Violations that are deliberate or multiple or due to negligence.

Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include actions that:

- a. Were inadvertent;
- b. Were isolated or infrequent;
- c. Were due to improper or inadequate training;
- d. Demonstrate a positive attitude towards the discharge of security responsibilities.

Guideline L: Outside Activities

The Concern. Involvement in certain types of outside employment or activities is of security concern if it poses a conflict with an individual's security responsibilities and could create an increased risk of unauthorized disclosure of classified information.

Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:

Any service, whether compensated, volunteer, or employment with:

- a. A foreign country;
- b. Any foreign national;
- c. A representative of any foreign interest;
- d. Any foreign, domestic, or international organization or person engaged in analysis, discussion, or publication of material on intelligence, defense, foreign affairs, or protected technology.

Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:

- a. Evaluation of the outside employment or activity indicates that it does not pose a conflict with an individual's security responsibilities;
- b. The individual terminates the employment or discontinues the activity upon being notified that it is in conflict with his or her security responsibilities.

Guideline M: Misuse of Information Technology Systems

The Concern. Noncompliance with rules, procedures, guidelines or regulations pertaining to information technology systems may raise security concerns about an individual's trustworthiness, willingness, and ability to properly protect classified systems, networks, and information. Information Technology Systems include all related equipment used for the

communication, transmission, processing, manipulation, and storage of classified or sensitive information.

Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:

- a. Illegal or unauthorized entry into any information technology system;
- b. Illegal or unauthorized modification, destruction, manipulation, or denial of access to information residing on an information technology system;
- c. Removal (or use) of hardware, software or media from any information technology system without authorization, when specifically prohibited by rules, procedures, guidelines or regulations;
- d. Introduction of hardware, software or media into any information technology system without authorization, when specifically prohibited by rules, procedures, guidelines or regulations.

Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:

- a. The misuse was not recent or significant;
- b. The conduct was unintentional or inadvertent;
- c. The introduction or removal of media was authorized;
- d. The misuse was an isolated event;
- e. The misuse was followed immediately by a prompt, good faith effort to correct the situation.

Appendix E
Number of Cases in Which Source Type Yielded Information
(Numerators Used in Tables 3 and 5)

Appendix E
Number of Cases in Which Source Type Yielded Information
(Numerators Used in Tables 3 and 5)

Tables E-1 and E-2 show the number of cases containing Issue-Relevant Information and Mitigating Information. For example, the SF-86/SPHS yielded Issue-Relevant Information in 167 cases at DOD (Table E-1). These cases represent 11% of the 1506 cases in which the SF-86/SPHS was included, as shown in Table 3 in the body of this report.

Table E.1
Cases in Which Source Types Yielded Issue-Relevant Information

	<i>DOD</i>	<i>OPM</i>	<i>CIA</i>	<i>NRO</i>
	<i>Cases</i>	<i>Cases</i>	<i>Cases</i>	<i>Cases</i>
Self-Report Sources				
SF-86/SPHS	167	202	42	93
Subject Interview	238	235	188	224
Records Sources				
Credit Reports	167	233	80	84
NAC/Subjects	46	39	4	2
NAC/Spouse-Cohabitant	0	20	1	4
LACs	27	33	5	2
Employment Records	7	16	0	9
Military Records	2	0	0	0
Security Records	6	6	5	13
Title 31 Records	4	7	0	0
Medical Records	5	2	7	13
Education Records	0	0	0	0
Public Records	38	61	11	8
Residence Records	2	4	1	0
Miscellaneous Records	15	4	3	2
Interviews of Others				
Coworker Interviews	12	33	22	7
Supervisor Interviews	32	37	38	18
Listed References	9	1	23	7
Developed References	24	0	27	10
Residence Interviews	6	26	11	7
Ex-Spouse Interviews	15	17	4	11
Medical Interviews	16	0	17	10
Area Security Managers	---	---	8	---
Miscellaneous Interviews	0	2	0	1

Table E.2
Cases in Which Source Types Yielded Mitigating Information

	<i>DOD</i>	<i>OPM</i>	<i>CIA</i>	<i>NRO</i>
	<i>Cases</i>	<i>Cases</i>	<i>Cases</i>	<i>Cases</i>
Self-Report Sources				
SF-86/SPHS	137	273	33	92
Subject Interview	384	418	189	279
Records Sources				
Credit Reports	58	319	61	102
NAC/Subjects	51	167	0	3
NAC/Spouse-Cohabitant	1	33	1	0
LACs	9	72	5	2
Employment Records	6	16	0	5
Military Records	1	2	0	0
Security Records	3	5	2	10
Title 31 Records	0	3	0	0
Medical Records	4	2	8	10
Education Records	0	0	0	0
Public Records	21	49	6	6
Residence Records	0	4	1	0
Miscellaneous Records	12	4	2	4
Interviews of Others				
Coworker Interviews	10	26	15	7
Supervisor Interviews	33	24	16	21
Listed References	7	7	15	5
Developed References	21	1	13	4
Residence Interviews	3	28	7	2
Ex-Spouse Interviews	9	10	1	3
Medical Interviews	22	0	19	14
Area Security Managers	---	---	2	---
Miscellaneous Interviews	0	1	1	0

Appendix F
Best Sources of Issue-Relevant Information
for Certain Adjudicative Issues

Appendix F

Best Sources of Issue-Relevant Information for Certain Adjudicative Issues

While some sources are clearly more productive than others with regard to yielding Issue-Relevant Information in general, it is also true that some types of sources are more productive than others for certain types of adjudicative issues. Tables F-1 through F-9 show the types of sources that are most productive in yielding Issue-Relevant Information for the various adjudicative areas. Similar to the previous tables, which conceptualized source yield at the case level (i.e., the frequency that each type of source provided Issue-Relevant Information in a case), figures in the following tables represent the number of cases in which a given source type provided information about a specific type of issue. Percentages reflect the proportion of cases in which the source type provided Issue-Relevant Information of a specific type, out of all the cases in which *all* source types provided Issue-Relevant Information of a specific type. For example, Table F-1 shows that there were a total of 46 cases in which Issue-Relevant Information about Alcohol Consumption was provided from all source types for all SSBI-PRs at DOD. Of these 46 cases, the SF-86/SPHS yielded information in 25 cases, which represents 45% of all of the cases in which Issue-Relevant Alcohol Consumption Issue information was generated. Importantly, because different source types often provide Issue-Relevant Information about the same type of issue in the same case, the total cases containing Issue-Relevant Alcohol Consumption information is smaller than the total of all cases in which all sources yielded Issue-Relevant Alcohol Consumption information.

The table for each adjudicative area lists only those source types that actually provided information about that particular adjudicative issue. There is no table for Allegiance to the U.S. because no source reported Issue-Relevant Information about this issue. Similarly, there are no tables for Foreign Preference or Outside Activities Issues, as each of these areas had only one instance in which a source type reported Issue-Relevant Information.

Source Types Yielding Issue-Relevant Information for Alcohol Consumption Issues

Table F-1 shows the number of cases in which source types yielded Issue-Relevant Information for Alcohol Consumption. Not listed are Employment Records, Title 31 Records, Education Records, Residence Records and Area Security Managers as they yielded no Issue-Relevant Information for Alcohol Consumption Issues.

Table F.1
Source Types Yielding Issue-Relevant Information
for Alcohol Consumption Issues

	<i>DOD (n=46)</i>		<i>OPM (n=46)</i>		<i>CIA (n=17)</i>		<i>NRO (n=13)</i>	
	<i>Cases</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Cases</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Cases</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Cases</i>	<i>%</i>
Self-Report Sources								
SF-86/SPHS	25	54%	19	41%	3	18%	6	46%
Subject Interview	24	52%	27	59%	12	71%	6	46%
Records Sources								
Credit Reports	1	2%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
NAC/Subjects	5	11%	9	20%	0	0%	1	8%
NAC/Spouse-Cohabitants	0	0%	5	11%	1	6%	2	15%
LACs	14	30%	12	26%	3	18%	1	8%
Military Records	1	2%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Security Records	0	0%	1	2%	0	0%	0	0%
Medical Records	3	7%	1	2%	0	0%	1	8%
Public Records	6	13%	1	2%	0	0%	0	0%
Miscellaneous Records	1	2%	0	0%	1	6%	1	8%
Interviews of Others								
Coworker Interviews	1	2%	7	15%	3	18%	0	0%
Supervisor Interviews	6	13%	5	11%	3	18%	1	8%
Listed References	3	7%	1	2%	2	12%	0	0%
Developed References	4	9%	0	0%	5	29%	0	0%
Ex-Spouse Interviews	5	11%	4	9%	0	0%	2	15%
Medical Interviews	3	7%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Residence Interviews	0	0%	7	15%	1	6%	0	0%
Miscellaneous Interviews	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	1	8%

Source Types Yielding Issue-Relevant Information for Criminal Conduct

Table F-2 shows the number of cases in which source types yielded Issue-Relevant Information for Criminal Conduct Issues. Not listed are Security Record, Title 31 Records, Medical Records, Education Records, Medical Interviews and Area Security Manager Interviews as they yielded no Issue-Relevant Information for Criminal Conduct Issues.

Table F.2
Source Types Yielding Issue-Relevant Information
for Criminal Conduct

	DOD (n=52)		OPM (n=96)		CIA (n=17)		NRO (n=16)	
	Cases	%	Cases	%	Cases	%	Cases	%
Self-Report Sources								
SF-86/SPHS	25	48%	32	33%	0	0%	7	44%
Subject Interview	35	67%	43	45%	8	47%	5	31%
Records Sources								
Credit Reports	1	2%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
NAC/Subjects	20	38%	23	24%	4	24%	1	6%
NAC/Spouse-Cohabitants	0	0%	18	19%	1	6%	3	19%
LACs	13	25%	29	30%	4	24%	2	13%
Employment Records	1	2%	1	1%	0	0%	0	0%
Military Records	1	2%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Public Records	11	21%	17	18%	3	18%	0	0%
Residence Records	0	0%	0	0%	6	35%	0	0%
Miscellaneous Records	0	0%	0	0%	1	6%	1	6%
Interviews of Others								
Coworker Interviews	0	0%	6	6%	0	0%	0	0%
Supervisor Interviews	3	6%	5	5%	1	6%	1	6%
Listed References	0	0%	1	1%	2	12%	0	0%
Developed References	0	0%	0	0%	1	6%	0	0%
Ex-Spouse Interviews	3	6%	7	7%	0	0%	1	6%
Residence Interviews	0	0%	6	6%	1	6%	0	0%
Miscellaneous Interviews	0	0%	1	1%	0	0%	1	6%

Source Types Yielding Issue-Relevant Information for Drug Involvement

Table F-3 shows the number of cases in which source types yielded Issue-Relevant Information for Drug Involvement Issues. Not listed are Credit Reports, Employment Records, Military Records, Security Records, Title 31 Records, Education Records, Residence Records, Miscellaneous Records, Coworker Interviews, Listed References, Ex-Spouse Interviews, Area Security Managers and Miscellaneous Interviews because they yielded no Issue-Relevant Information for Drug Involvement Issues.

Table F.3
Source Types Yielding Issue-Relevant Information
for Drug Involvement

	DOD (n=13)		OPM (n=19)		CIA (n=2)		NRO (n=4)	
	Cases	%	Cases	%	Cases	%	Cases	%
Self-Report Sources								
SF-86/SPHS	6	46%	4	21%	0	0%	2	50%
Subject Interview	3	23%	8	42%	1	50%	3	75%
Records Sources								
NAC/Subjects	7	54%	5	26%	0	0%	0	0%
NAC/Spouse-Cohabitants	0	0%	6	32%	1	50%	0	0%
LACs	1	8%	1	5%	0	0%	0	0%
Medical Records	1	8%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Public Records	1	8%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Interviews of Others								
Supervisor Interviews	1	8%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Developed References	2	15%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Medical Interviews	1	8%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Residence Interviews	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	1	25%

Source Types Yielding Issue-Relevant Information for Emotional/Mental and Personality Disorders

Table F-4 shows the number of cases in which source types yielded Issue-Relevant Information for Emotional/ Mental and Personality Disorders. Not listed are Credit Reports, Military Records, Title 31 Records, Education Records, Residence Records and Area Security Managers because they yielded no Issue-Relevant Information for Emotional/Mental and Personality Disorders.

Table F.4
Source Types Yielding Issue-Relevant Information
for Emotional/Mental and Personality Disorders

	<i>DOD (n=41)</i>		<i>OPM (n=82)</i>		<i>CIA (n=55)</i>		<i>NRO (n=34)</i>	
	<i>Cases</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Cases</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Cases</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Cases</i>	<i>%</i>
Self-Report Sources								
SF-86/SPHS	19	46%	44	54%	1	2%	14	41%
Subject Interview	27	66%	64	78%	46	84%	31	91%
Records Sources								
NAC/Subjects	3	7%	3	4%	0	0%	0	0%
NAC/Spouse-Cohabitants	0	0%	2	2%	0	0%	0	0%
LACs	0	0%	2	2%	1	2%	0	0%
Employment Records	0	0%	2	2%	0	0%	1	3%
Security Records	0	0%	1	1%	0	0%	1	3%
Medical Records	2	5%	1	1%	7	13%	12	35%
Public Records	0	0%	2	2%	1	2%	1	3%
Miscellaneous Records	1	2%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Interviews of Others								
Coworker Interviews	0	0%	4	5%	7	13%	0	0%
Supervisor Interviews	6	15%	9	11%	8	15%	5	15%
Listed References	0	0%	0	0%	8	15%	0	0%
Developed References	3	7%	0	0%	8	15%	3	9%
Ex-Spouse Interviews	1	2%	4	5%	3	5%	1	3%
Medical Interviews	13	32%	0	0%	16	29%	10	29%
Residence Interviews	0	0%	4	5%	0	0%	1	3%
Miscellaneous Interviews	0	0%	1	1%	0	0%	0	0%

Source Types Yielding Issue-Relevant Information for Financial Considerations

Table F-5 shows the number of cases in which source types yielded Issue-Relevant Information for Financial Considerations Issues. Not listed are NAC/Spouse-Cohabitants, Medical Interviews, Education Records, Area Security Managers and Miscellaneous Interviews because they yielded no Issue-Relevant Information for Financial Considerations.

Table F.5
Source Types Yielding Issue-Relevant Information
for Financial Considerations

	<i>DOD (n=198)</i>		<i>OPM (n=267)</i>		<i>CIA (n=98)</i>		<i>NRO (n=108)</i>	
	<i>Cases</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Cases</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Cases</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Cases</i>	<i>%</i>
Self-Report Sources								
SF-86/SPHS	49	25%	72	27%	3	3%	15	14%
Subject Interview	108	55%	101	38%	48	49%	82	76%
Records Sources								
Credit Reports	166	84%	233	87%	79	81%	84	78%
NAC/Subjects	15	8%	9	3%	0	0%	0	0%
LACs	0	0%	1	<1%	0	0%	0	0%
Employment Records	1	1%	5	2%	0	0%	1	1%
Military Records	1	1%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Security Records	2	1%	0	0%	0	0%	1	1%
Title 31 Records	4	2%	7	3%	0	0%	0	0%
Public Records	23	12%	46	17%	8	8%	6	6%
Residence Records	2	1%	4	1%	1	1%	0	0%
Miscellaneous Records	11	6%	3	1%	2	2%	1	1%
Interviews of Others								
Coworker Interviews	4	2%	6	2%	2	2%	1	1%
Supervisor Interviews	7	4%	9	3%	5	5%	3	3%
Listed References	2	1%	0	0%	2	2%	1	1%
Developed References	4	2%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Ex-Spouse Interviews	2	1%	3	1%	0	0%	0	0%
Residence Interviews	2	1%	7	3%	3	3%	1	1%

Source Types Yielding Issue-Relevant Information for Foreign Influence Issues

Table F-6 shows the number of cases in which source types yielded Issue-Relevant Information for Foreign Influence Issues. Not listed are LACs, Military Records, Security Records, Education Records, Public Records, Residence Records, Miscellaneous Records, Medical Interviews and Area Security Managers because they yielded no Issue-Relevant Information for Foreign Influence Issues.

Table F.6
Source Types Yielding Issue-Relevant Information
for Foreign Influence Issues

	DOD (n=69)		OPM (n=63)		CIA (n=73)		NRO (n=91)	
	Cases	%	Cases	%	Cases	%	Cases	%
Self-Report Sources								
SF-86/SPHS	52	75%	55	87%	31	42%	57	63%
Subject Interview	51	74%	31	49%	47	64%	78	86%
Records Sources								
Credit Reports	0	0%	0	0%	1	1%	0	0%
NAC/Subjects	2	3%	1	2%	0	0%	1	1%
NAC/Spouse-Cohabitants	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	1	1%
Employment Records	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	1	1%
Title 31 Records	0	0%	1	2%	0	0%	0	0%
Medical Records	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	1	1%
Interviews of Others								
Coworker Interviews	2	3%	4	6%	7	10%	3	3%
Supervisor Interviews	5	7%	0	0%	7	10%	1	1%
Listed References	3	4%	0	0%	8	11%	5	5%
Developed References	8	12%	0	0%	8	11%	4	4%
Ex-Spouse Interviews	0	0%	0	0%	1	1%	0	0%
Residence Interviews	4	6%	3	5%	4	5%	1	1%
Miscellaneous Interviews	0	0%	1	2%	0	0%	0	0%

Source Types Yielding Issue-Relevant Information for Misuse of Information Technology Systems Issues

Table F-7 shows the number of cases in which source types yielded Issue-Relevant Information for Misuse of Information Technology Systems Issues. Not listed are SF-86/SPHSs, Credit Reports, NAC/Subjects, NAC/Spouse-Cohabitants, LACs, Employment Records, Military Records, Title 31 Records, Medical Records, Education Records, Public Records, Residence Records, Miscellaneous Records, Listed References, Ex-Spouse Interviews, Medical Interviews, Area Security Manager Interviews and Miscellaneous Interviews because they yielded no Issue-Relevant Information for Misuse of Information Technology Systems Issues.

Table F.7
Source Types Yielding Issue-Relevant Information
for Misuse of Information Technology Systems Issues

	<i>DOD (n=3)</i>		<i>OPM (n=1)</i>		<i>CIA (n=12)</i>		<i>NRO (n=24)</i>	
	<i>Cases</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Cases</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Cases</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Cases</i>	<i>%</i>
Self-Report Sources								
Subject Interview	3	100%	0	0%	2	17%	9	38%
Records Sources								
Security Records	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	3	13%
Interviews of Others								
Coworker Interviews	0	0%	0	0%	1	8%	0	0%
Supervisor Interviews	0	0%	1	100%	1	8%	1	4%
Developed References	0	0%	0	0%	2	17%	0	0%

Source Types Yielding Issue-Relevant Information for Personal Conduct Issues

Table F-8 shows the number of cases in which source types yielded Issue-Relevant Information for Personal Conduct Issues. Not listed are Security Records, Title 31 Records and Education Records because they yielded no Issue-Relevant Information for Personal Conduct Issues.

Table F.8
Source Types Yielding Issue-Relevant Information
for Personal Conduct Issues

	DOD (n=79)		OPM (n=50)		CIA (n=54)		NRO (n=29)	
	Cases	%	Cases	%	Cases	%	Cases	%
Self-Report Sources								
SF-86/SPHS	26	33%	3	6%	2	4%	3	10%
Subject Interview	45	57%	13	26%	19	35%	18	62%
Records Sources								
Credit Reports	1	1%	0	0%	1	2%	0	0%
NAC/Subjects	13	16%	3	6%	0	0%	0	0%
NAC/Spouse-Cohabitants	0	0%	1	2%	0	0%	0	0%
LACs	5	6%	2	4%	0	0%	0	0%
Employment Records	4	5%	8	16%	0	0%	3	10%
Military Records	1	1%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Medical Records	2	3%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Public Records	5	6%	5	10%	1	2%	3	10%
Residence Records	1	1%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Miscellaneous Records	2	3%	1	2%	0	0%	0	0%
Interviews of Others								
Coworker Interviews	3	4%	11	22%	2	4%	2	7%
Supervisor Interviews	11	14%	14	28%	6	11%	2	7%
Listed References	1	1%	0	0%	1	2%	1	3%
Developed References	5	6%	0	0%	6	11%	2	7%
Ex-Spouse Interviews	10	13%	8	16%	2	4%	8	28%
Medical Interviews	1	1%	0	0%	1	2%	0	0%
Area Security Managers	---	---	---	---	1	2%	---	---
Residence Interviews	0	0%	9	18%	1	2%	3	10%
Miscellaneous Interviews	0	0%	1	2%	0	0%	0	0%

Source Types Yielding Issue-Relevant Information for Security Violations Issues

Table F-9 shows the number of cases in which source types yielded Issue-Relevant Information for Security Violations Issues. Not listed are Credit Reports, NAC/Spouse-Cohabitants, LACs, Military Records, Title 31 Records, Medical Records, Education Records, Residence Records, Miscellaneous Records, Medical Interviews and Miscellaneous Interviews because they yielded no Issue-Relevant Information for Security Violations Issues.

Table F.9
Source Types Yielding Issue-Relevant Information
for Security Violations Issues

<i>DOD (n=25)</i>		<i>OPM (n=6)</i>		<i>CIA (n=92)</i>		<i>NRO (n=52)</i>		
	<i>Cases</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Cases</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Cases</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Cases</i>	<i>%</i>
Self-Report Sources								
SF-86/SPHS	1	4%	0	0%	0	0%	30	58%
Subject Interview	18	72%	0	0%	60	65%	0	0%
Records Sources								
NAC/Subjects	2	8%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Employment Records	2	8%	2	33%	0	0%	2	4%
Security Records	4	16%	4	67%	5	5%	12	23%
Public Records	0	0%	0	0%	6	7%	0	0%
Interviews of Others								
Coworker Interviews	3	12%	1	17%	2	2%	2	4%
Supervisor Interviews	1	4%	1	17%	10	11%	6	12%
Listed References	0	0%	0	0%	1	1%	0	0%
Developed References	1	4%	0	0%	3	3%	1	2%
Ex-Spouse Interviews	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	1	2%
Area Security Managers	0	0%	0	0%	7	8%	0	0%
Residence Interviews	0	0%	0	0%	1	1%	0	0%

Source Types Yielding Issue-Relevant Information for Sexual Behavior Issues

Table F-10 shows the number of cases in which source types yielded Issue-Relevant Information for Sexual Behavior Issues. Not listed are Military Records, Security Records, Title 31 Records, Medical Records, Education Records, Residence Records, Miscellaneous Records, Listed Reference Interviews, Medical Interviews, Area Security Manager Interviews and Miscellaneous Interviews because they yielded no Issue-Relevant Information for Sexual Behavior Issues.

Table F.10
Source Types Yielding Issue-Relevant Information
for Sexual Behavior Issues

	<i>DOD (n=12)</i>		<i>OPM (n=8)</i>		<i>CIA (n=7)</i>		<i>NRO (n=1)</i>	
	<i>Cases</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Cases</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Cases</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Cases</i>	<i>%</i>
Self-Report Sources								
SF-86/SPHS	1	8%	3	38%	0	0%	0	0%
Subject Interviews	4	33%	5	63%	1	14%	1	100%
Records Sources								
Credit Reports	1	8%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
NAC/Subjects	2	17%	2	25%	0	0%	0	0%
NAC/Spouse-Cohabitants	0	0%	1	13%	0	0%	0	0%
LACs	0	0%	4	50%	0	0%	0	0%
Employment Records	1	8%	0	0%	0	0%	1	100%
Public Records	0	0%	2	25%	0	0%	0	0%
Interviews of Others								
Coworker Interviews	0	0%	1	13%	0	0%	0	0%
Supervisor Interviews	1	8%	1	13%	0	0%	1	100%
Developed References	2	17%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Ex-Spouse Interviews	4	33%	2	25%	1	14%	0	0%
Residence Interviews	0	0%	2	25%	0	0%	0	0%

